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I

n one of his contributions to e New Mormon Challenge, “Can
the Real Problem of Evil Be Solved?” Carl Mosser (an evangelical
graduate student at the University of St. Andrews, St. Mary's College)
argues that, far from resolving what he calls the real problem of
evil, the Latter-day Saint view of God exacerbates the problem. He
concludes that (1) the Latter-day Saint view does not resolve the
real problem of evil, and (2) the Latter-day Saint God cannot simply
eliminate evil at will, and therefore evil remains a problem even
for God. e real problem of evil, according to Mosser, is not the
incompatibility of God’s goodness and power with the existence of
evil, but the fact that there is any real evil at all. Mosser distinguishes
the real problem of evil from what he calls the merely intellectual
problem of evil. e intellectual problem of evil, according to Mosser,
is not a real problem but merely a “puzzle to be solved,” arising from
the view that if an all-powerful and perfectly good being has created
a world that contains what merely appears to be evil, then that is
Review of Carl Mosser. “Can the Real Problem of Evil Be Solved?”
in e New Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses of
a Fast-Growing Movement, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser, and
Paul Owen, 212–18. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002. 535 pp.,
with glossary and indexes. $21.99.
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inconsistent with an omnipotent God’s existence (p. 213). Just how
there can be a real problem of evil, where a real evil exists to be
overcome by God’s omnipotence and also a world that contains what
merely appears to be evil but truly is not, Mosser never addresses or
explains.
Is ere a Problem of Evil?
Mosser maintains that there really isn’t a problem of evil at all.
First, he asserts that Alvin Plantinga has resolved the logical problem
of evil that arises from the inconsistency among the notions that (1) God
is a perfectly good being who would create a world without any genuine evil if he could; (2) God is an omniscient and all-powerful being
who can create a world without genuine evil; and yet (3) genuine evil
exists. For this problem to arise, the notion of genuine evil must be
grasped. Genuine evil is an act or event the nature of which is such
that the world would be better, all things considered, had it not occurred. It is evil that is not justified because it is not a necessary condition to obtain a greater good. Given this understanding of genuine
evil, these propositions constitute an inconsistent triad.
So has Plantinga resolved the logical problem of evil? In the
view of perhaps most analytic philosophers of religion, Plantinga has
successfully answered the logical problem of evil as it was presented by
John Mackie, who argued that God could create persons who always
do what is right.1 Plantinga has shown that if persons have libertarian
free will, God cannot create persons and bring it about that they
always do what is right.2 However, Plantinga has not shown that (1),
(2), and (3) are consistent. He argues that every apparent evil, for all
that we know, may be justified by a greater good such as free will.
us Plantinga rejects (3) by claiming that we are not in a position
1. John L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind, n.s., 64 (1955): 200–212. See Daniel
Howard-Snyder, introduction to e Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Daniel HowardSnyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), xii–xiii.
2. Alvin Plantinga, e Nature of Necessity (1974; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992),
164–95.
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to make “all things considered” judgments.3 It is just logically possible
that every instance of evil may result from free acts of others, and, for
all we know, God may be justified in not overriding the free decisions
of creatures given his purposes.
Does this response constitute a defeat of the logical problem of
evil? Hardly. First, Plantinga’s response does not exonerate the compatibilist position that has been the majority view held by creedal
Christians since the time of Augustine. Plantinga’s defense assumes
the libertarian view of free will, which holds that free will is incompatible with an act being caused. Compatibilists believe that free
will is compatible with an act being caused.4 Further, Plantinga has
not shown that God is constrained by logic to create morally
irresponsible persons such as we are if he creates ex nihilo. Plantinga
assumes that God must create morally fallible persons if he creates
them free. However, that is not true given the evangelical view of
creation ex nihilo, for if God creates ex nihilo, then he can create any
persons that it is logically possible to create. He certainly could have
created more morally sensitive and rational persons than we are.5
Richard Swinburne has argued that a perfectly rational being is
necessarily good.6 ere is no logical reason that God could not have
created perfectly rational beings who are perfectly good even though
they are free to choose evil if they wish. If Swinburne is correct, the
fact that a person always rationally chooses to do what is right is not
incompatible with libertarian free will. Given the creedal view, there
3. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 464–84; and “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in e Evidential Argument from Evil,
69–96. e same point is made by William P. Alston, “e Inductive Argument from Evil
and the Human Cognitive Condition,” in e Evidential Argument from Evil, 97–125.
4. James F. Sennett, “e Free Will Defense and Determinism,” Faith and Philosophy
8/3 (1991): 340–53.
5. For a technical treatment of this issue, see Ben Huff, “Contingency in Classical
Creation: Problems with Plantinga’s Free-Will Defense,” Element: An E-Journal of Mormon
Philosophy and eology, www.nd.edu/~rpotter/huff_element1-1.html, available as recently as 17 March 2003.
6. Richard Swinburne, e Coherence of eism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993),
182–88.
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is no reason that God could not have created perfectly rational
persons who would always see by the light of reason that choosing
what is right is the most rational course. us God had open to him
the possibility of creating more intelligent and morally sensitive creatures who would bring about less evil than we do through our sheer
irrationality. God is thus morally indictable for having created
creatures who bring about more evil than other creatures he could
have created from nothing.
Further, Plantinga explains natural evils by arguing that it is logically possible that God created devils free in a libertarian sense and
with enough power to bring about earthquakes, tornadoes, diseases,
cancer, and so forth. But how does God’s creating beings he foreknows will freely bring about vast amounts of evil get him off the
hook for natural evils? It seems that creating devils and then granting
them enough power to interfere with the natural order of things is
itself an instance of evil. ere is no logically necessary reason that
God would have to grant devils such power to wreak havoc with the
natural order and thereby to bring about vast amounts of suffering.
Far from constituting a defense of the problem of evil, Plantinga has
simply given a scenario that is an instance of divine culpability for
natural evil.7
Mosser also maintains that no one has stated a successful evidential problem of evil. e evidential problem of evil argues that, given
the types and sheer magnitude of evils that we experience, it is probable that events occur, which, all things considered, the world would
be better off if they had not occurred. Whereas the logical problem of
evil relies on deductive logic, the evidential problem of evil relies on
inductive evidence to establish the claim that probably the types and
amounts of evil that we actually experience are inconsistent with God’s
existence. Certain events are so overwhelmingly, crushingly evil that
7. See David L. Paulsen and Blake T. Ostler, “Sin, Suffering, and Soul-Making:
Joseph Smith on the Problem of Evil,” in Revelation, Reason, and Faith: Essays in Honor of
Truman G. Madsen, ed. Donald W. Parry, Daniel C. Peterson, and Stephen D. Ricks (Provo,
Utah: FARMS, 2002), 237–84.
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we cannot begin to fathom how they could be necessary for a greater
good; our every attempt to explain them is either inadequate or morally unacceptable. e circumstance of a little girl in Detroit being
raped multiple times and then brutally tortured, beaten, and murdered by her mother’s boyfriend, or the days of pain of a fawn burned
in a forest fire, seem to be actual instances of such inexplicable evils.8
e problem with the evidential problem of evil is that humans
may well not be in a position to make the kinds of probability judgments required.9 Can we really discern accurately whether God could
have reasons for the types and amounts of evils we experience?
However, such a view seems to confuse the fact that while there is
much that we don’t know, it doesn’t follow that what we do know cannot support such probability judgments. We are in a position to know
that we cannot begin to fathom any greater good that is accomplished
by such evils. We can also see that any explanation we come up with
is either inadequate, because we cannot see that such evils are necessary to accomplish the greater good, or repulsive, because our explanations are themselves morally reprehensible. us the evidential
problem of evil is precisely that, so far as we can see, a God such as is
described in the creeds cannot exist while there are also genuine evils.
Yet there appear to be genuine evils. us we are justified in concluding that, so far as we can see, the God of the creeds cannot exist. us
the evidential problem of evil is not decisive, but it presents a problem
for those who trust their experience as veridical. On the grounds that it
is morally insensitive and fails to grasp the nature of the challenge such

8. See William L. Rowe, “e Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” in
e Evidential Argument from Evil, 1–11; Bruce Russell, “Defenseless,” in e Evidential
Argument from Evil, 193–205; Richard M. Gale, “Some Difficulties in eistic Treatments
of Evil,” in e Evidential Argument from Evil, 206–18; and William L. Rowe, “e
Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look,” in e Evidential Argument from Evil,
262–85.
9. See Plantinga, “Epistemic Probability and Evil,” 69–96; and Alston, “e Inductive
Argument from Evil,” 97–125.
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evils present for the evangelical view of God, I also vehemently reject
Mosser’s characterization of such evils as a mere “puzzle to be solved.”
Does Mormonism Resolve the Problem of Evil?
Mosser admits that Mormonism does in fact solve the intellectual problem of evil—that is, the logical and evidential problems of
evil: “e Mormon concept of God can provide an apparently quick
and easy solution to the intellectual problem of evil by denying God’s
omnipotence and that he is a Creator [ex nihilo]” (p. 217). Of course,
such a concession does not concede much since Mosser believes
that the intellectual problem has been solved by Plantinga. In addition, Mosser argues—correctly, in my view—that limiting God’s
power buys a solution to the problem of evil at too high a price if
the sole explanation for evil is that God does not have enough power
to prevent the evils that actually occur. For example, God could have
seen what Hitler was up to and have eliminated him, even without
omnipotence. God had the power to prevent such evils because, on
the Latter-day Saint view, he had at least the power of a human, and a
human standing near Hitler could have killed him. Mosser contends
that if Latter-day Saints argue that God must have had his reasons
for not preventing evils which mere humans have the power to eliminate, “they are using a strategy for answering the problem of evil long
employed by classical theists, and it is difficult to see the advantage of
Mormon finitism” (p. 215).
However, Mosser has overlooked the fact that God need not
employ such strategies if he is omnipotent in the sense accepted by
evangelicals. Latter-day Saints do not employ the same strategy as
creedal Christians because it makes sense on the Latter-day Saint
view to say that God must create an environment conducive to
the growth of intelligences as they actually are. It makes no sense
within the context of creedal Christianity to limit God in this way
because he can simply create any persons he wants out of nothing.
e God of the creeds could have created a world that is free of any
evil whatsoever. He could have created persons who were already
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morally superior in a world without any natural evils. He could have
created already morally advanced creatures who did not require the
extreme conditions we encounter in this life as a basis for growth.
However, such soul-making strategies work within the Latter-day
Saint worldview precisely because God cannot create out of nothing
just the persons he wants. In Mormonism, God’s goal is to assist us
to advance by confronting genuine challenges to aid our growth and
learning. Unlike the God of the creeds, the God of Latter-day Saint
belief did not create intelligences or determine their level of advancement and moral sensitivity. He takes us as we are and lovingly works
with us from there. God can have reasons to allow evils—even genuine evils—on the Latter-day Saint view because he must bring about
conditions conducive to the growth and advancement of persons like
us. ings may occur that do not make the world, all things considered, better than it would have been had they not occurred. It is not
better, all things considered, that a little girl be raped and murdered.
However, the fact that such acts can occur, that genuine evils are possible, is necessary to God’s plan where persons are genuinely free. If
God intervened every time someone were about to bring about a
genuine evil, he would frustrate his purposes for us. For example, if
knives were steel-hard when spreading butter but suddenly turned to
rubber whenever a person wanted to use a knife to stab another person, the natural order necessary for God’s plan to be accomplished
would be frustrated. ere would not even be the possibility of morally significant free actions in such an environment.
us Latter-day Saints have strategies available to them to resolve
the problem of evil that are not available to creedal Christians—even
if a lack of divine power is not the reason for such a solution. Indeed,
I have argued elsewhere that, on the Latter-day Saint view, God has
“maximal power”—or all the power that it is consistently conceivable
for a God to have in relation to a real world having a real history and
a real social environment that includes free persons.10
10. See Blake T. Ostler, Exploring Mormon ought: e Attributes of God (Salt Lake
City: Kofford Books, 2001), chap. 4.
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Mosser’s Argument against the Latter-day Saint Solution
Mosser offers two reasons why he feels that even though Latterday Saint doctrines “can solve the intellectual problem” of evil, such
a solution is nevertheless bought at “two high costs” (p. 215). First, a
part of the LDS answer to evil is that “there is an opposition in all
things” (2 Nephi 2:11). us it appears that the actuality of evil is
built into the structure of reality. Second, Mosser argues that a part
of some LDS theodicies is that God is limited by an intractable chaos
that he organizes into an ordered cosmos. Mosser explains that because on the LDS view God is constrained by the “inviolability of the
freewill” of other beings and because of the “uncreated laws of nature”
and the “intractableness of eternal matter,” Latter-day Saints can consistently argue that “some evils occur that God is simply powerless to
prevent” (p. 214). us he concludes that evil will never be overcome
according to the Latter-day Saint view because if “evil is in part due
to the inherent nature of matter, then God simply cannot overcome
it” (p. 216). He asserts that this is the real problem of evil because
the Bible views God as decisively eliminating evil at the end of time
through his omnipotent power.
Mosser claims that the notion of opposition in all things “is simply
unfounded.” He disposes of this doctrine with a quotation from John
Kekes: “Whatever is true of phenomena requiring contrasting aspects,
it is not true of good and evil. It is absurd to suppose that there can be
kindness only if there is cruelty, or freedom only if there is tyranny”
(p. 215). Now it is true that we do not need to be unkind in order to be
kind; however, it does not follow that we could know and appreciate
what kindness is unless we had some idea of what it would be like for
persons not to be kind. In the Book of Mormon, the ancient Hebrew
prophet Lehi teaches that, in order to appreciate our experience of
good, we must be capable of recognizing evil. us his point seems to
be that opposition is essential to our knowledge of both good and evil
(an epistemological issue), not that every good always requires an offsetting evil to exist (an ontological issue). As Lehi states:
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If Adam had not transgressed . . . he would have remained in
the garden of Eden. And all things which were created must
have remained in the same state in which they were aer
they were created; and they must have remained forever, and
had no end. And they would have had no children; wherefore
they would have remained in a state of innocence, having no
joy, for they knew no misery; doing no good, for they knew no
sin. But behold, all things have been done in the wisdom of
him who knoweth all things. Adam fell that men might be;
and men are, that they might have joy. (2 Nephi 2:22–25)
A similar point is made in the Book of Moses, where God tells
Adam, “Inasmuch as thy children are conceived in sin, even so when
they begin to grow up, sin conceiveth in their hearts, and they taste the
bitter, that they may know to prize the good” (Moses 6:55). e point is
that tasting the bitterness of evil in the world affords us an opportunity
to know and learn to prize what otherwise we could not appreciate.
Moreover, there is also an ontological dimension to “opposition
in all things” (2 Nephi 2:11) in addition to the epistemological dimension. ere are virtues that require opposition in order to be realized.
Lehi argues that God’s purpose in creating humankind was to make it
possible for us to know joy. As a condition to experiencing this joy, it
is necessary to be able to choose between good and evil and to
experience both bitter and sweet. While it is not necessary to be
unkind to be kind, it is necessary to have genuine choices among
good and evil alternatives to be free in a morally significant sense.
Indeed, F. R. Tennant has argued that our concept of good has meaning
only when related to concepts such as temptation, courage, and
compassion.11 Courage is developed through facing real challenges,
compassion comes about as a response to the presence of pain and
suffering, and temptation exists only where there is the possibility of
choosing evil. As Hugh McCann argues:
11. F. R. Tennant, Philosophical eology (London: Cambridge, 1928), 1:188–89.
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True virtue has to be tested and refined. Someone with
the virtue of patience must have tasted affliction and disappointment, and seen things through; the courageous person
has to have endured danger and risk; the compassionate
must have struggled with temptation, sorrow and hardship.
e point of such experiences is not merely to strengthen
our tendency to act rightly. . . . [Virtue] requires that we know
trial and suffering, and human weakness in the face of them,
in the only way they truly can be known: through experience. . . . In short, true virtue requires knowledge of good and
evil—not just as they are manifested in our own struggle
with sin, but as they are played out in the travail of the whole
world. As we gain this knowledge, we become more suited
for God’s friendship.12
It is significant that Lehi’s discussion of opposition in all things
occurs in the context of agency as a necessary condition to allow
individuals to be agents who can choose for themselves. e point
of opposition in all things is not that we must be evil to be good, but
that in order to be moral agents in any significant sense we must be
capable of choosing between good and evil. If we were capable only
of good acts, we might be innocent, but we could not be moral agents.
us it is not the actuality of evil that is necessary but the possibility
that persons can make significant choices. ere are no significant
choices if we are not moral agents in the sense that we can freely
choose either good or evil.
us Mosser has misunderstood the thrust of the doctrine of
opposition in all things. His argument works only if the actuality of
evil is built into the world, not its mere possibility. Mosser argues that
the doctrine of opposition in all things makes the existence of evil
a “necessary” feature of the world (p. 216). However, the doctrine of
12. Hugh J. McCann, “Divine Providence,” in e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta (2001), at plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/providencedivine/ as of 17 March 2003.
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opposition in all things implies only that the possibility of evil is necessary to a world designed to function as an environment of personal
growth. Moreover, Mosser himself must accept that evil is a necessary possibility within the world, for he accepts Plantinga’s free-will
defense. e prominent feature of the free-will defense is that God
cannot create a world containing free creatures and guarantee that
there is no evil. Even omnipotence cannot guarantee that there are
both significantly free creatures and no evil.
is last point is also significant because it shows that Mosser’s
claimed advantage for his omnipotent God who could rid the world
of evil by the exercise of omnipotence is illusory if God also chooses
to have free creatures. Moreover, if persons remain free, God cannot
guarantee that all evil will be eliminated as Mosser claims. Indeed,
I would guess that Mosser rejects the doctrine of universal salvation. If so, he cannot consistently adopt his own argument against
Mormonism, for there will always exist the evil that some persons
will remain in an unsaved condition. Moreover, it seems to me that
such a possibility is built into the very structure of the nature of love.
If what God seeks with us is a truly loving relationship, God cannot
unilaterally guarantee by his power that we will return his love with
our own reciprocating love. For love cannot be coerced, forced, or
intimidated into being by sheer power. Any love that is worthy of
the name leaves the beloved free to choose whether to enter the relationship and, once in it, whether to maintain the relationship. God
cannot coerce our love. Omnipotence is simply irrelevant to what is
really valuable in our relationship with God—mutual and reciprocal
love that respects the dignity and freedom of the beloved. It is the
very nature of love that makes libertarian free will valuable in the
first place. Mosser may envision a God who exists all alone before
creation without any relationships with others, but the living God is
a person who seeks our love in return for his. Such love is a good so
great that it justifies leaving us free despite the evil we may cause by
the use of such freedom. Mosser’s solution to what he calls the real
problem of evil cannot be adopted consistently with his adherence to
the free-will defense.
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Further, is chaos really intractable in Latter-day Saint thought
in the sense that it constrains God’s will? Hardly. God speaks; chaos
hears and obeys God’s will.13 Mosser argues that we should see chaos
as fundamentally evil and thus the creation out of chaos in Latterday Saint thought is inconsistent with the assertion in Genesis
that God’s creation is good (p. 216). However, Mosser’s argument
misunderstands the LDS (and biblical view) twice over. First, God did
not declare the creation “good” until aer he had finished creating it
by organizing it. It is not good until it is organized. e very structure
of the biblical narrative presents God as working with chaotic powers
that he subdues by organizing the chaos into a good creation. Second,
chaos is not evil in Latter-day Saint thought—it just is. e point of
referring to the eternal environment in which God lives is that it is
necessary that natural laws arise when matter is ordered. God cannot
have water that is not H2O, nor can he have water that supports
human life but does not cause humans to drown when they inhale
it. ere is nothing inherently evil about chaos or eternal matter any
more than there is something inherently evil about natural laws.
Indeed, such laws are a necessary condition to any environment that
could act as an arena of soul-building. If there were no regularities,
we could not learn from our experience.
Further, whereas Mosser envisions the kingdom of God as being
brought about by God’s unilateral power, Latter-day Saints expect
the kingdom of God to be brought about through our love for God.
Only when we truly do the will of God freely will his kingdom reign.
e kingdom is not brought about by coercive power, but by loving
persuasion. e kingdom of God is not found in the sky but inside
of us. If the kingdom is not drawn from our loving hearts and our
willingness to do God’s will on earth as it is done in heaven, his
kingdom cannot come.
But what shall we say if Mosser is somehow correct that God could
once and for all eliminate evil from the world by his omnipotence? It
13. Lectures on Faith 1.22.
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seems to me that God is indictable for not doing so right now if he
can. If God can really do as Mosser says—if he can really create a
kingdom without evil immediately by merely willing to do so—then
what possible justification could he have for allowing the kinds of evil
we experience? God could save everyone by simply willing it—given
Mosser’s assumptions—but he apparently desires some people to go
to hell. Whence then evil? Mosser gives us a God who leaves us in
the midst of evil when there is no possible justification for doing so.
Is this God really a serious contender for the title of the God of love?
Should we worship sheer power in the place of the living God?

